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PROTECTING SELLER AS TO BUYER'S CREDIT
CLAUSES IN SALES CONTRACTS PROTECTING THE
SELLER AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF THE BUYER'S
CREDIT
By HAROLD C. HAVIGHURST*
T HE extensive borderland between rule of law and implied in-
tention, which supplies interstitial provisions for bargains into
which parties enter, affords some protection to a seller who has
agreed to extend credit to a buyer, when it subsequently appears
that the latter has become insolvent prior to the delivery of the
goods. It is clear that under such circumstances the seller may,
even in the absence of any contract provision, refuse to deliver
except for cash.' It may be observed that this right is not affect-
ed by the question whether title to the goods has passed to the
buyer. The apparent implications of the title concept developed
for allocating risks of another kind have been rendered impotent
as far as this problem is concerned by the superimposed machinery
of the seller's lien. Although title has passed, and by reason of
the agreement to extend credit no lien exists, the insolvency of the
buyer calls it into being.2 An extension of this protection to the
seller is found in the right to stop in transitu.3 The seller who
exercises his privilege in any of the above ways is not limited to
avoiding the contract. If it is a favorable one for him from the
market standpoint, he may offer to deliver for cash, and if the
buyer refuses to take the goods, the seller has his claim for
damages.'
*Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
Valuable assistance in the preparation of this article has been rendered
by S. G. Schoenbrod, J. D., Northwestern University, 1933, Member of
the Chicago Bar.
'Ex parte Chalmers, (1873) 8 Ch. App. 289, 42 L. J. Bcy. 37, 28 L. T.
325; Williston, Sales, 2d ed., 577 and cases there cited; Crummey v. Rauden-
bush, (1893) 55 Minn. 426, 56 N. W. 1113; Pratt v. S. Freeman & Sons
Mfg. Co., (1902) 115 Wis. 698, 92 N. W. 368. Insolvency within the
meaning of these rules is the inability to meet current obligations, not
insolvency in the bankruptcy sense. H. Muehlstein & Co. v. Hicknmn,
C. C. A. 8th Cir., (1928), 26 F. (2d) 40; Crummey v. Raudenbush, (1893)
55 Minn. 426, 56 N. W. 1113.
-Uniform Sales Act, sec. 54, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 8431.
(lc).
3Uniform Sales Act, sec. 54, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 8431.
4Muehlstein & Co. v. Hickman, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928) 2(j F. (2d) 40;
Patten's Appeal, (1863) 45 Pa. St. 151 (stoppage in transit) ; Ex parte
Stapleton, (1879) 10 Ch. Div. 586. But to preserve his rights the seller
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In some instances, if the contract is the common one for de-
livery in installments, the seller may also be relieved from the
risk of the buyer's possible insolvency by refusing delivery on
the ground that past shipments have not been paid for promptly.
To be sure a seller to justify such action must show that the breach
was material. 5 But if circumstances are such as to lead the seller
to believe that the delay in payment has been due to financial em-
barrassment, that would usually lead to a holding that the breach
was materialY It is clear, of course, that when the seller relies
on material breach under such circumstances, his right will be
either to delay future shipments or to cancel. There is no prece-
dent for the view that he may in such a case withdraw credit and
offer to deliver for cash, even though the breach is not so serious
as to justify cancellation.7  It is probable, however, that if he
does in fact offer to deliver for cash, that would constitute such
clear evidence of the fact that he was actuated by fear of the
buyer's inability to pay, and not merely by the desire to escape an
unfavorable contract, that a court would be more disposed to
hold the breach material. Furthermore, in those jurisdictions
which impose on the buyer under certain conditions the
duty to avoid the consequences of the breach by accepting the offer
for cash,8 he may sometimes, as a practical matter, withdraw credit
without serious consequences, when a cancellation would subject
him to substantial damages. He takes the very substantial risk,
however, that he will not be able to show that the buyer was able
to pay cash. And, furthermore, this rule is not helpful if the
must offer to deliver for cash. Florence Mining Co. v. Brown, (1888) 124
U. S. 385, 8 Sup. Ct. 531, 31 L. Ed. 424.
5Helgar Corp. v. Warner's Features, (1918) 222 N. Y. 449, 119 N. E.
113. Before the enactment of the Uniform Sales Act, sec. 45 (2), a few
American jurisdictions followed the English test as to whether the breach
is a repudiation [Sale of Goods Act, sec. 31 (2) 1. See Williston, Sales, 2d.
ed. 467c. And even after its enactment there is occasional evidence of a
curious survival of the language. See Cadillac Machine Co. v. Mitchell-
Diggins Iron Co., (1919) 205 Mich. 107. 171 N. W. sec. 479. Needless to
say, this test makes the seller's position more difficult.
61n National Machine & Tool Co. v. Standard Shoe Machinery Co.,
(1902) 181 Mass. 275. 63 N. H. 900, the court says, "A failure to pay a
small sum promptly because of difficulty in raising the money . . . may have
a greater effect than a similar failure simply because . . . of some mis-
understanding."
7There is an ill-considered dictum that this may be done. in Lincoln v.
Chas. Ashuler Mfg. Co., (1910) 142 Wis. 475, 483. 125 N. W. 908, 911.
8See McCormick, Avoiding Injurious Consequences. (1931) 37 NV. Va.
L. Q. 331, 345.
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contract is profitable to him and he would like to withdraw credit,
but retain his rights under the contract.9
The manifold problems that arise in connection with the ap-
plication of the rules above summarized are not dealt with in this
article. It has been necessary thus to set them forth, however, to
show the reasons for the appearance in recent years of special
clauses in sales contracts which sellers have insisted upon in-
corporating for the purpose of securing more adequate protection
than they would otherwise enjoy. Without such a clause it would
be necessary to prove insolvency, whereas impairment of credit
short of insolvency may well expose the seller to a risk of not
receiving his money, which he does not care to take. Even if he
believes the buyer insolvent, the step of withdrawing credit would
entail the risk that a court or jury would not take the same view
if the matter should come to litigation. If the contract has become
unprofitable for him, it is true, his problem is seldom serious.
Usually the settlement or the damages the buyer might show would
not be greater than the loss to him of performing the contract.
In a few jurisdictions, as already noted, the duty of the buyer to
avoid the consequences of the breach by accepting an offer to sell
for cash would relieve the seller of paying damages if he guesses
wrong, and in any case it is probable that the buyer in a rising
market would find the necessary cash if credit is with-
drawn. But it is when the seller has a favorable contract and does
not wish to jeopardize his profits, yet fears to continue to extend
credit, that the doubts above enumerated are particularly troubling.
It is perfectly obvious, also, that the protection afforded by
the material breach doctrine is usually not of much value. Although
a buyer's financial condition is badly impaired, his payments may
be prompt. If payments are late, the uncertainty of being able to
show a material breach at least gives the buyer a talking point and
encourages him to litigate unless he is given a favorable settle-
ment.
Thus, as above suggested, sellers have felt the need for more
substantial protection against the impairment of the buyer's finan-
9The disadvantage of being unable to withdraw credit is shown by the
facts of J. S. Lingo & Co. v. Okey Hosiery Mills, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1923)
291 Fed. 573, where it appeared that the seller, who had agreed to extend
credit, was doubtful of the buyer's ability to pay and required cash or
security, relying on some delinquency in payment. In an action for damages,
however, he was nonsuited in the lower court, and on appeal it was stated
that he could only go to a jury on the question whether the buyer had told
the seller he would be unable to pay.
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cial responsibility. To this end various clauses have been intro-
duced into contracts, designed to eliminate as far as possible the
difficulties noted. Of course if there is any doubt about a buyer's
credit when the contract is made, the most desirable arrangement
would be a secured transaction. But the needs of tile seller's
customers and fear of losing business to competitors frequently
make this out of the question for a seller. A clause in the con-
tract form, more or less obscure, dealing with a contingency at
the time not anticipated, will not ordinarily drive away customers
who understand that credit is being extended to them. But when
the occasion arises, such a clause may be very helpful in enabling
the seller to cancel or to sell only on a cash basis, without sub-
jecting himself in some instances to an action for damages, or
in others to the loss of a favorable bargain.
Rights reserved to the seller under clauses designed for this
purpose may be classified as follows :10
As to the nature of the right reserved:
1. To cancel the contract.
2. To delay subsequent shipments.
3. To withdraw credit and cancel if the buyer fails to pay cash.
4. To withdraw credit and enforce the contract against the
buyer if he fails to pay cash.
As to the condition upon which the right may be exercised:
a. Upon the failure of the buyer to make payment when due
for a past installment of goods delivered.
b. Upon the impairment of the buyer's credit.
c. If in the seller's opinion the buyer's credit is impaired.
d. Unconditionally.
loThese clauses are found with various wordings. A common one in
use in the oil trade and others might under a permissible construction be
classified as 4c, and is sometimes found in combination with 4a. It reads as
follows, "In the event that payment for goods shipped is not promptly
made in accordance with the terms of this sale, or in the event that the
credit or the financial responsibility of the purchaser becomes impaired or
unsatisfactory to the seller, the seller reserves the right to demand cash or
satisfactory security before making shipments." See James B. Berry's Sons
Co. v. Monark Gasoline and Oil Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 74.
In the sugar trade a clause (4d) is used, reading, "Terms . . . subject to
the approval of seller's credit department." See A. B. Small Co. v. Lamborn
& Co., (1925) 267 U. S. 248, 45 Sup. Ct. 300, 69 L. Ed. 597. The right to
delay shipment (2) is found only in combination with the right to cancel
for non-payment. Rights conditioned only on impairment of the buyer's
credit (c) are rare, since most clauses containing such conditions use the
terms "in the opinion of the seller" or "unsatisfactory to the seller." A
clause conditioned merely on the financial responsibility of the buyer be-
coming unsatisfactory appeared in the contract involved in In re Independent
Coal Corp., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 1. Whether a particular
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MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION
In a surprisingly large number of cases arising under con-
tracts containing such clauses the buyer has urged that the agree-
ment lacked mutuality. This might indicate that among meibers
of the bar there is a widespread notion that this term is not syn-
onymous with consideration as applied to bilateral agreements.
For it is rather apparent that in all except one, or possibly two, of
the types of clauses enumerated, the seller's undertaking is a
substantial one and the conditions precedent to termination are
beyond his control. It is only upon the view that a measure of in-
equality or unfairness will render the agreement lacking in mu-
tuality that there appears to be any ground whatever for advanc-
ing such a contention. Obviously in any case where the seller's
only right is to withdraw credit upon the failure of the buyer to
pay promptly for goods delivered, his undertaking to deliver for
cash remains and provides consideration for the buyer's promise."
Of course no question could be raised as to the validity of an
agreement originally for a cash sale. The provision here, though
in the form of an unconditional option to withdraw credit, is in
substance not different from an agreement to sell for cash, with
such extension of credit as might be made, regarded as an act of
grace on the seller's part.
The right to cancel stands on a different basis. No draftsman
worthy of the name would hope that the contract would be up-
held if an unconditional right to cancel is provided for. It is,
therefore, seldom found in precisely those terms.' In Bernstein
v. W. B. 111fg. Co.,'3 however, it appeared that the draftsman,
in his zeal for the seller's cause, went so far as to defeat his pur-
pose. The clause read, "Subject to a limit of credit and determin-
ation at any time by the seller." It was argued that "determination"
referred only to credit, and this would seem to be a permissible
clause falls within one or another of the categories enumerated is often
a difficult question of construction.
"A. B. Small Co. v. Lamborn & Co., (1925) 267 U. S. 248, 45 Sup. Ct.
300, 69 L. Ed. 597; James B. Berry's Sons Co. v. Monark Gasoline & Oil
Co. (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 74; La Grange Grocery Co. v. Lam-
born & Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1922) 283 Fed. 869; Klimax Overall Co. v.
Converse & Co., (1929) 39 Ga. App. 742, 148 S. E. 349; Mendel v. Converse
& Co., (1923) 30 Ga. App. 549, 118 S. E. 586; Slater v. Savannah Sugar
Refining Co., (1922) 28 Ga. App. 280, 110 S. E. 759.
'
2For an example of a rare contract providing for such an unconditional
right, see American Agricultural Chemical Co. v. Kennedy & Crawford,
(1904) 103 Va. 171, 48 S. E. 868.
13(1921) 238 Mass. 589, 131 N. E. 200.
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construction, especially in view of the fact that there was another
clause in the contract dealing with the conditions of shipment,
which was so worded as to preserve mutuality of obligation."
The court, however, construed the above clause as giving an ab-
solute right to cancel, and held the contract lacking in mutuality. 1"
Clauses giving the seller the right to cancel if in his opinion
the buyer's credit has become impaired are also close to the line.
However, the requirement that the seller must act in good faith le
makes it necessary that there be some basis in fact for his de-
termination, and is probably sufficient to make it impossible for
him to use the power given merely to escape a bad bargain. Never-
theless the leeway accorded might enable him in some instances to
use the clause for such an ulterior purpose, so that his under-
taking is in a measure illusory. No case has been found, however,
which holds such an agreement lacking in mutuality.
The clause permitting cancellation upon failure to pay promptly
is also susceptible of a similar use in instances where the failure to
pay by the exact date is due merely to misunderstanding or in-
advertence, and not to financial difficulties.' But the contention
that such a clause makes the seller's promise without consideration
is clearly unfounded, in view of the unquestioned undertaking to
perform so long as the buyer makes his payments promptly."
QUESTIONS OF CONSTRUCTION
Unfortunately for the seller, the draftsmanship responsible for
these clauses has not always been of a very high order. It is
hardly necessary to state that this means that there has been a
failure to appreciate in advance the possible issues and the ne-
14See Bernstein v. NV. B. Mfg. Co., (1920) 235 Mass. 425, 126 N. E. 796.
15In A. B. Small Co. v. Lamborn & Co.. (1925) 267 U. S. 248, 45 Sup.
Ct. 300, 69 L. Ed. 597, and in La Grange Grocery Co. v. Lamborn & Co.,
(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1922) 283 Fed. 869, it was unsuccessfully argued that the
clause in the standard sugar contract (supra note 10) gave the right to
cancel, and that therefore there was no mutuality.
16See footnote 35.
'-Dow Chemical Co. v. Detroit Chemical Works, (1919) 208 Mich.
157. 175 N. W. 269; Southern Coal & Coke Co. v. Bowling Green Coal Co.,
(1914) 161 Ky. 477, 170 S. W. 1185.
'SCasinghead Gas Co. v. Osborn. (1921) 269 Pa. St. 395. 112 Atil. 469;
Dale Oil Refining Co. v. City of Tulia. (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 25 S. W.
(2d) 671. In Peck v. Stafford Flour Mills Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1923) 289
Fed. 43, the claim of lack of mutuality rested on a little more substantial
basis in that the clause permitted cancellation upon the failure to make
payment under the contract or prior contracts; the buyer was in default
under prior contracts at the time the new one was made, and remained so.
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cessity of selecting the category in the above classification which
is intended. The result has been that the seller has sometimes
lost his hoped-for advantage. In view of the fact that the words
appear on the seller's forms often in obscure places, and that there
is a measure of judicial sympathy for a hard-pressed buyer, doubt-
ful questions have more frequently been resolved against the seller.1"
One question has been whether general language calling for ap-
proval of the buyer's credit is to be taken to be a condition of con-
tract formation or of performance. Doubtless in some instances the
seller using such general language contemplates only one investiga-
tion of credit at the outset, and if this is true he should not later
have the benefit of an afterthought. If the "contract" is made sub-
ject to the approval of credit, this would, without question, be
the proper construction. In McLain - Haddcn - Sinipcrs Co. v.
Trent Rubber Co.,2 0 however, it was held that a clause providing,
"application of these [credit] terms subject to the approval of our
[seller's] credit department," gave only the opportunity to approve
at the outset. When deliveries started, the terms of credit became
unconditional. 2 1 The same argument was made in A. B. Small Co.
v. Lamborn & Co.,2 2 with respect to the standard sugar contract,
providing that "terms" are "subject to approval of seller's credit
department." This contract, however, specifies alternative terms,
one for cash and another for credit. The obvious meaning is
that the credit department has tlhe choice of terms, and not that the
approval is a condition precedent to the contract.
Another question that rarely arises is whether the clause gives
the seller an option, or whether the extension of credit is un-
qualified. In W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Wilson,"3 it appeared that the
provision read that payment was to be "by cash or by installment
'
9There is an indication of this attitude in Dery v. Blate, (1924) 239
N. Y. 203, 146 N. E. 204. The court said, "The contract is drawn on one
of the seller's order blanks. Its ambiguities should be resolved against him."
In dealing with the option to withdraw credit, it is said that the question is
to what extent "the purchasers put themselves at the mercy of the seller."
20(C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1921) 275 Fed. 831.
2
'A similar questionable result was reached in Anchor Cotton Mills
v. Bellow, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1922) 279 Fed. 390, where the buyer's order
stipulated 10 days credit, "terms and dating subject to the right of seller...
to establish and from time to time modify, regulate and fix buyer's credit
limit:' It was said that acceptance of the order after investigation of credit
constituted "final approval as to credit."
22(1925) 267 U. S. 248, 45 Sup. Ct. 300, 69 L. Ed. 597. This contention
appears only in argument of counsel in 69 L. Ed. 597. It is not mentioned
in the opinion.
23(1927) 141 S. C. 182, 139 S. E. 395.
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payments satisfactory to the seller;" the majority of the court,
influenced by the fact that sureties were required for the buyer,
held that the buyer was entitled to credit, cash payment apparently
being regarded as an option of the buyer.
2 4
The most frequent controversy arises with respect to the ques-
tion whether a particular clause gives the right to withdraw credit
and, if the buyer fails to pay cash, maintain a claim for damages
for breach of contract, or whether, in such event, his only right
is to cancel. Seldom does the language preclude doubt on this
point. Yet it is only if the seller has this right that he is able to
retain the benefits of a contract that is advantageous, except for
the danger that the account may be uncollectible.
Some courts have recognized this. Thus the clause involved in
James B. Berry's Sons Co. v. Monark Gasoline & Oil Co., 2 after
providing for the right to demand cash,2 6 proceeded, "Upon failure
to provide cash or satisfactory security . . . the seller reserves the
right to discontinue making shipment and to cancel the sale . . .
thereby terminating all obligation on the part of the seller." In
spite of the fact that the only right stated was to cancel, the court
construed this to mean that the clause might be used not only
as a "shield" but also as a "sword." 2 7 On the other hand, in
Dery v. Blate, "8 a clause providing that "the amount of credit to be
extended to the buyer may be determined at any time by the seller"
was construed to give no right to the seller to compel the buyer to
take the goods for cash. In some respects this latter clause more
readily admits of the interpretation that the buyer could be re-
quired to pay cash than the former. The court emphasizes that
the amount only of credit could be limited, apparently implying
that it could not be withdrawn entirely. However, the decision is
not rested squarely on that point, but rather on the ground that.
though credit might be withdrawn, the only right of the seller was
to refuse to deliver. -'  The two quite distinct lines of argument
211n Hazel Hill Caming Co. v. Roberts Bros., (1916) 129 Md. 306,
99 Atl. 424. the seller unsuccessfully made the rather weak contention that
"cash less 11,_% 10 (lays" gave it the option to demand cash.
25(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 74.
2rEThis part of the clause is set forth in footnote 10.
27I1 Midland Linseed Products Co. v. Charles R. Sargent Co., (C.C.A.
5th Cir. 1922) 281 Fed. 704, the same result is reached on the curious
reasoning that if the seller's only right were to cancel, the buyer could
compel the seller to invoke the clause by refusing payment and thus the
agreement would be lacking in mutuality.
28(1924) 239 N. Y. 203, 146 N. E. 204.
29 This reasoning follows precisely that of the earlier appellate division
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are confused in the opinion. The court appears to be much im-
pressed by the fact that the contract was on the seller's form and
that the clause was in the contract solely by reason of its appear-
ance in the rules of a trade association which incorporated by
reference. 0
ISSUES OF FACT
When rights are reserved conditioned on non-payment, a ques-
tion of waiver is frequently presented. Primarily the material
facts upon which to rest this claim are previous acceptance of
late payments or any other acts of the seller calculated to lead the
buyer to believe that prompt payment will not be insisted upon.
But if it appears that the seller is taking advantage of a minor
delay in payment for the purpose of escaping a bad bargain, the
tendency of the court is to find waiver if possible."  On the other
hand, if the seller seems to be justified in believing that delay in
payment means difficulty in raising the money, the tendency will
be to resolve a doubtful issue of waiver in his favor.32 Thus it is
case, Raw Silk Trading Co. v. Katz, (1922) 201 App. Div. 713, 194 N. Y. S.
638, where the clause read, "Subject to credit limit at seller's discretion."
In Wilton Mfg. Co. v. Bergdr, (1921) 196 App. Div. 121, 187 N. Y. S. 487,
under a clause providing, "Subject to credit limit placed on your account
by our credit department," it was contended that the seller was merely
entitled to refuse deliveries, but held that the seller could demand cash for
goods in excess of credit limit, the buyer having acquiesced in that construc-
tion by previously paying cash. See also Mendel v. Converse & Co., (1923)
30 Ga. App. 549, 118 S. E. 586, where it was assumed that a clause similar
to that involved in Dery v. Blate gave the option to demand cash.
3OAnother minor question of construction was raised in Rathbone, Sand
& Co. v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., (1921) 198 App. Div. 889, 191
N. Y. S. 210, affirmed (1923) 234 N. Y. 642, 138 N. E. 480. The contract
gave the "options" to the seller to postpone shipments until prior install-
ments were paid for or to cancel. It would seem clear that the exercise of
the option to postpone shipments would not preclude the exercise of the
right to cancel. The contention was made that it did, but it probably would not
have occurred to counsel to raise the point if the simple alternative had
been used without the unnecessary words "at seller's option."
3 1See Texas Co. v. Pensacola Maritime Corp., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1922)
279 Fed. 19; also, Everett v. Emmons Coal Mining Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir.
1923) 289 Fed. 686, where the waiver issue was not raised, but the court
ignored the clause, saying (p. 691), "The debit balance . . .was relatively
so small and was so far subject to good faith dispute, that we think it an
unsatisfactory and insufficient basis for a refusal to ship." In Dow Chemical
Co. v. Detroit Chemical Works, (1919) 208 Mich. 157, 175 N. W. 269, the
waiver issue was decided against the buyer when there was apparently no
question of credit impairment. The facts in support of the claim of waiver
were extremely slim, however, it appearing merely that the second shipment
was made after payment for the first one fell due, but before the seller
knew it had not been promptly mailed.
3 2Cadillac Machine Co. v. Mitchell-Diggins Iron Co., (1919) 205 Mich.
107, 171 N. W. 479; Rathbone, Sand & Co. v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke
Co., (1921) 198 App. Div. 889, 191 N. Y. S. 210, affirmed (1923) 234 N. Y.
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obvious that the condition of the buyer's credit and the significance
of the delay as it appears to the seller afford a background for the
determination of the issue, just as they do when, in the absence
of such a clause, the inquiry is addressed to the question of material
breach.3 3
When the condition relates to the impairment of the buyer's
credit, an issue of fact may be raised. It is conceded that this
means something less than insolvency. The buyer may be able to
meet his current obligations, but facts may be known which make
his ability to continue to do so somewhat doubtful- However,
evidence of prompt payments under other contracts would prob-
ably be material as tending to show no impairment. The financial
statements of the buyer at the time of making the contract and
and at the time the clause is invoked might be compared. It could
hardly be said, however, that any minor decrease of surplus would
constitute an impairment within the meaning of the contract. It
has been held that reports of commercial credit rating agencies
are admissible.
3 4
Because of such doubt in determining this issue, the clause
making the opinion of the seller the condition of the exercise of
the right is much more common and more desirable for the seller.
Here the issue becomes one of good faith.3 5 Some basis for a
belief that the buyer's credit is impaired must be shown. If the
buyer can find evidence of other motives, it should be admissible
on this issue. 36 Thus, even if the right reserved is to cancel, the
642, 138 N. E. 480. In the first case cited the trial court made the rather
curious finding that the buyer must "be held to have realized that long-
continued outward sufferance toward a debtor does not, ipso facto, inlicate
long-continued inward satisfaction on the part of the creditor."
33 See- Crocker Chair Co. v. Edward Hines Hardwood & Hemlock Co.,
(1930) 201 Wis. 415, 230 N. W. 61.
_1On these points see Trainor v. Buchanan Coal Co., (1923) 154 Minn.
204, 191 N. W. 431; Dodge Bros. v. General Petroleum Corp., (1932) 54
Nev. 249, 13 P. (2d) 218.
35James B. Berry's Sons Co. v. Monark Gasoline & Oil Co., (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 74; Fidelity Fuel Co. v. Martin Howe Coal Co.,
(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 470; Everett v. Emmons Coal Mining
Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1923) 289 Fed. 686; Midland Linseed Products Co.
v. Charles R. Sargent Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1922) 281 Fed. 704; Trainor v.
Buchanan Coal Co., (1923) 154 Minn. 204, 191 N. W. 431; Corn Products
Refining Co. v. Fasola, (1920) 94 N. J. 181. 109 Atl. 505. In the last cited
case, the court said, "There must be a real want of satisfaction with the
buyer's financial responsibility, and the refusal to ship . . . must be based
upon that reason alone." Thus in New Jersey there is the additional require-
ment that the seller have no other motive. In other jurisdictions, other
motives are merely evidence on the good faith issue.
3 6Fidelity Fuel Co. v. Martin Howe Coal Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1926)
15 F. (2d) 470. In Trainor v. Buchanan Coal Co., (1923) 154 Minn. 204,
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buyer has some protection against arbitrary action by the seller.
The same evidence comes in, but is submitted to the trier of
facts under a formula more favorable to the seller.
ADVANTAGES OF VAR1OUS CLAUSES TO THE SELLER
Clauses of the type giving the seller special rights when the
buyer fails to meet his payments on the date due are, when stand-
ing alone, unsatisfactory in many respects. Although they pur-
port to eliminate the uncertain inquiry as to whether failure to
pay promptly constitutes a material breach, they fail to provide for
the common case where a struggling buyer is meeting all his pay-
ments on the particular contract on the dot, yet complete default
and bankruptcy may be just around the corner. Under these
circumstances they are, therefore, too narrow. But under others,
a literal interpretation gives rights broader than necessary for the
purpose of achieving the protection desired. A perfectly solvent
buyer may occasionally fail to forward his check on the exact
date it is called for. A seller for whom the contract has become
burdensome may use the clause to escape.'- So applied, the clause
makes the contract operate in a one-sided and unfair manner; and
the impression thus created may in a close case operate prejudicially
to the seller. The additional phrase, that no forebearance or course
of dealing shall affect the right of the seller, has sometimes been
added."8 No case has been found where the effect of such an
addition has been squarely considered, but it is at least doubtful
if a seller can thus in advance provide for the avoidance of the
plain inferences from his subsequent conduct.
The right to cancel on impairment of the buyer's credit, either
when shown as a fact or in the seller's opinion. makes possible the
use of evidence of non-payment as bearing on this issue without
subjecting its effect to nullification by a contention on the part of
the buyer of waiver. 9 A clause giving such a right is also capable
191 N. W. 431, other motives were apparently in evidence, but the question of
admissibility was not discussed.
37Southern Coal & Coke Co. v. Bowling Green Coal Co., (1914) 161
Ky. 477, 170 S. W. 1185; Dow Chemical Co. v. Detroit Chemical Works,
(1919) 208 Mich. 157, 175 N. W. 269; H. R. Wyllie China Co. v. Vinton,
(1920) 97 Or. 350, 192 Pac. 400.
38See Everett v. Emmons Coal Mining Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1923)
289 Fed. 686; Texas Co. v. Pensacola Maritime Corp.. (C.C.A. 5th Cir.
1922) 279 Fed. 19.
39Dodge Bros. v. General Petroleum Corp., (1932) 54 Nev. 249. 13 P.
(2d) 218.
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of use for escaping a bad bargain,40 whereas if the only right is
to withdraw credit, the chances are that in a favorable market
the buyer will find the cash. But such a clause is not entirely
satisfactory if the purpose is really to obtain protection against
credit impairment. For it seems to offer no aid in preserving a
favorable bargain without continuing the credit risk. The choice
in the event of impairment is either to continue with the contract
on the terms of payment as they stand, or to terminate it entirely.4 '
A clause merely giving the right to delay future shipments
when the buyer has not paid would add nothing to the rights which
the seller would have in most jurisdictions in the absence of such
a provision. It is of value, however, if a court follows the rather
unfortunate test that the buyer's non-payment excuses the seller
only when it shows an intent to repudiate.4 2 Such a clause, as well
as the broader one, giving the right to terminate, tends to eliminate
the unjustifiable advantage to the buyer given by this formula,
when an impasse is reached as sometimes happens, the seller re-
fusing to ship until paid and the buyer refusing to pay until
goods are shipped.43
A clause giving the right to withdraw credit upon failure of
the buyer to pay promptly would in some instances be advan-
tageous, but it is seldom found alone. Often it is combined with a
clause giving such a right in the event the seller is dissatisfied with the
buyer's credit.44  Such clauses are not unfair and go far toward
achieving the desired protection. Obviously an even more advan-
40111 Fidelity Fuel Co. v. Martin Howe Coal Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir.
1926) 15 F. (2d) 470, it appears that the seller attempted to use it for this
purpose, although his success would depend on the result of the second
trial.
41Sterling Mint Co. v. Dellenbarger Machine Co., (1932) 107 Pa.
Super. 287, 163 Atl. 370.
42 See footnote 5. This formula was devised to meet the facts of Freeth
v. Burr, (1874) L. R. 9 C. P. 208, 46 L. J. C. P. 91, 29 L. T. 773, where
the seller was holding up shipment until the buyer paid for the first install-
ment and the buyer was witholding payment until the second installment
was shipped. The seller was far behind in delivering the first installment,
the market had advanced, and every indication was that the second would
never be shipped. Under such circumstances it would seem that the buyer
was justified in witholding payment. The "intent to repudiate" test fits
these facts. But its enunciation as a general formula has provided a stun-
bling block which even the valiant efforts of Professor Williston have not
served wholly to eradicate. In the absence of such a formula, it would seem
to follow without question that the seller could refuse to make further
shipments until payments already due are made. See Williston, Sales, 2d ed.,
sec. 467j.
43See H. R. Vyllie China Co. v. Vinton, (1920) 97 Or. 350, 192
Pac. 400.
44See footnote 10.
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tageous clause is the one making the withdrawal of credit option-
al.45 In any event, the clause ought to make clear that the failure
of the buyer to tender cash or satisfactory security, when credit is
properly withdrawn, should constitute a breach of the contract.
Thus the type of clause appearing in the above outline as 4d is
unquestionably the best from the seller's point of view, provided
his purpose is actually to secure more adequate protection against
the risk of impairment of the buyer's credit. A combination of
4a and 4c would be an excellent second choice.
THE BUYER'S INTERESTS
This article has been written from the point of view of counsel
for the seller. Buyers who have sufficient bargaining power to
overcome the inertia of the form contract and the established
method of doing things may find it possible to insist that all such
clauses be stricken from the contract. Particularly objectionable
will be clauses giving the right to cancel on failure to make pay-
ment when due, and those giving the seller optional or discretionary
rights. Nevertheless, it will not always be advantageous to press
the matter too far. The possibility of jeopardizing a favorable
price proposition must be weighed against the seller's character
and the probability of occasion arising for the exercise of rights
provided for. No doubt most buyers, without benefit of counsel,
are apt to overstress the all important and imminent price term
as against the more remote provisions herein discussed. They
may also be satisfied by assurances that such clauses are never
invoked, or refrain from raising the point, because they do not
wish to appear doubtful of their own credit standing. For these
reasons, even if the bargaining power of buyers is great, the
clauses, if incorporated in the seller's form, will usually remain.
45Under such a clause the issue of good faith is not raised, since the
option is unconditional. In Siegel v. Heubshman, (1919) 187 App. Div. 548.
176 N. Y. S. 71, it was held error to submit the issue of good faith to thejury, but the court unnecessarily placed emphasis upon the fact that the
option was given to factors who guaranteed the buyer's credit. See also,
Gillman v. Dunmore Worsted Co., (1920) 183 N. Y. S. 47; Lyonette Silks
v. K. Wilbur Dolson Co., (1919) 187 App. Div. 473, 175 N. Y. S. 789.
Although cash may be required, the seller must be careful not to de-
mand a too specific security. In Wausau Canning Co. v. Woodruff, (1926)
189 Wis. 184, 207 N. W. 421, the court, on a questionable construction of
the seller's letter, held that he had breached the contract by requiring that
credit be established at a particular bank.
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PROSPECTIVE INABILITY IN THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS
By LAWRENCE B. WARDROP, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE LEGAL effect of prospective inability of the promisor to per-
form his part of the agreed exchange, has in large part been
denied systematic treatment by the courts, while the commen-
tators and textwriters have tended either to ignore the subject or
to assimilate it to related topics.'
The questions as to what constitutes inability, and as to the
legal consequences attendant thereon, have been brought before
the courts in numerous situations. The answer to the former can
be found only by an analysis of the facts of the particular case;
the latter, which assumes that the facts have been cast into the
legally significant category, is exemplified in the varied judicial
responses about to be explored.
Inasmuch as the cases dealing with this subject exhibit, in the
main, an inadequate analysis, it is the purpose of this paper to
examine those situations in which prospective inability has been
given recognized and occasionally well-defined effect: second, to
contrast with these the results reached in more obscure examples;
and third, in the course of doing this to attempt to answer the
question, basic in this inquiry, as to whether the courts have in
fact recognized any legally significant distinction hetween the
manifestations of inability which will give rise to a cause of action
*Of the New York Bar. Associated with McCanliss & Early, New
York City. The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Profes-
sor Edwin W. Patterson, of Columbia Law School, whose helpful criticism
and kind suggestions have been indispensable in the preparation of this
paper.
1 See, for instance, Page, Contracts, 2nd ed., secs. 2905, 2912, 2913,
2937, 2940, where the author treats the topic wholly from the standpoint
of anticipatory repudiation. To the writer's knowledge analytical treat-
ment will be found only in Williston, Contracts, secs. 877-880, 768, 1326,
1331, 875; Williston, Repudiation of Contracts, (1901) 14 Harv. L. Rev.
317 and 421; and Vold, Repudiation of Contracts, (1927) 5 Neb. L. B.
269, 303-308. See also Ballantine, Anticipatory Breach and Enforcement of
Contractual Duties, (1924) 22 Mich. L. Rev. 329; and Limburg, Anticipa-
tory Repudiation of Contracts, (1925) 10 Cornell Law Quart. 135, 163, 178,
both of whom follow Williston. Restatement, Contracts, secs. 280-287,
covers the same ground; Professor Williston's views will also be found in
Wald's Pollock on Contracts, 3d Am. ed. 354. Brief treatment is given in
Clark, Contracts, 4th ed., 616.
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for anticipatory breach against the promisor (the party whose
inability is in question), and those which might be said to furnish
only an excuse for non-performance of contractual duties by the
promisee.
II. WHEN PROSPECTIVE INABILITY GIVES RISE TO IMMEDIATE
CAUSE OF ACTION.
A. Voluntary Disablemnent.-That the prospective inability of
one party to a bilateral contract to perform his promise conferred
upon the other party both a cause of action and an excuse from
further performance on his part (embodied in the phrase "volun-
tarily putting it out of his power to perform"), was recognized by
courts in England many years before the doctrine of anticipatory
breach was given definite form2 and became a source of extensive
debate among legal writers. 3
In Sir Anthony Main's Case,4 inability in the form of voluntary
disablement to perform was early given this double significance.
The plaintiff lessee, with whom defendant lessor had covenanted
to make a new lease upon surrender by the former of his existing
lease at any time during its twenty-one year term, set forth this
covenant in his declaration of debt on the obligation. The plea
was that plaintiff had not surrendered the existing lease. On de-
murrer to the replication, which alleged that the obligor had suf-
fered a fine, and granted the land to the cognizee for eighty years,
it was held that Main had broken his covenant, and that the law
would not enforce the "vain and fruitless" act of surrender. It
was resolved that if a man
"seised of lands in fee covenant to enfeoff J. S. of them upon
request, and afterwards he makes a feoffment in fee of the said
lands; now in this case J. S. shall have an action of covenant with-
out request."
Judicial acquiescence in this resolution yielded decisions 3 which
were regarded as cogent analogies in Hochster v. Delatour.6
It may therefore be said that plaintiff's cause of action for
anticipatory breach grew out of certain well-defined effects of
21n Hochster v. Delatour, (1853) 2 E. & B. 678, 22 L. J. Q. B. 455, 22
L T. 0. S. 171.
3Cf. Williston, Repudiation of Contracts, (1901) 14 Harv. L. Rev. 317
and 421, with Ballantine, Anticipatory Breach and Enforcement of Con-
tractual Duties, (1924) 22 Mich. L. Rev. 329.
4(1596) 5 Co. Rep. 20b, Jenk. 256.5Short v. Stone, (1846) 8 Q. B. 358, 15 L. J. Q. B. 143. 6 L. T. 0. S.
316; Ford v. Tiley, (1827) 6 B. & C. 325, 5 L. J. 0. S. K. B. 169.
6(1853) 2 E. & B. 678, 22 L. J. Q. B. 455, 22 L. T. 0. S. 171.
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voluntary disablement, recognized, in cases in which as a matter
of fact it could be foreseen that future non-performance was high-
ly probable,' as giving the aggrieved party a cause of action before
the day, and as excusing him from the further performance of
conditions precedent.
Such conduct, giving rise to a reasonable inference not only
that the promisor will be unable to perform at the appointed time,
but likewise that he no longer intends to be bound by the con-
tract," has caused litigation most frequently in executory contracts
for the sale of land. If A has contracted to convey Blackacre
to B, at a given future date, and before the date conveys to C, an
array of authority holds that B thereupon acquires the right to
maintain an action against A for anticipatory repudiation," and is,
of course, privileged not to do the fruitless act of tendering per-
formance.
It is arguable, however, that such a conveyance might be made
for a purpose not inconsistent with final consummation of the
contract with B, and that by the seeming disablement, A has not
necessarily put it out of his power to perform.' 0 However much
weight this argument should be accorded as an original proposition,
it seems clear that the cases take an opposite view; they deny its
implication that A's conduct, to be treated as a breach, should more
forcibly indicate intent to repudiate," and, in general, ignore the
7 The possibility of regained ability was regarded as immaterial in
Short v. Stone, (1846) 8 Q. B. 358, 15 L. J, Q. B. 143, 6 L. T. 0. S. 316.
and Ford v. Tiley, (1827) 6 B. & C. 325, 5 L. J. 0. S. K. 13. 169. It was
held in the former that when defendant married A, this was a breach of
his agreement to marry B on request, and that B was excused from ever
making any request; if filing suit be regarded as a request, the breach by
unexcused inability is actual.8 See Williston, Contracts, sec. 1326.
9Cooley v. Moss, (1905) 123 Ga. 707, 51 S. E. 625; Bell v. Shields,
(1910) 18 Idaho 699, 111 Pac. 1076; Newcomb v. Brackett, (1819) 16 Mass.
161; Weaver v. Aitcheson, (1887) 65 Mich. 285; Householder v. Nispel,
(1923) 111 Neb. 156, 195 N. W. 932; Hunter v. \Venatchee Land Co..
(1908) 50 Wash. 438, 97 Pac. 494. The California cases were brought into
accord by Brimmer v. Salisbury, (1914) 167 Cal. 522, 140 Pac. JO. con-
taiming an extensive review of the decisions in that state; Crane v. East Side
Canal, etc., Co.. (Cal. App. 1934) 38 P. (2d) 467, (Cal. App. 1935) 44 P.
(2d) 455 (conveyance of water rights disabling defendant to supply water
to plaintiff). See also Slaughter v. Barnett, (1934) 114 Fla. 352, 154 So.
132, where it was held that a statement by the vendor before the (late fixed
for performance, that he does not intend to perform, does not entitle the
vendee to an action for anticipatory breach.
-oSee Webb v. Stephenson. (1895) 11 Wash. 342, 39 Pac. 952.
"In conferring upon the promisee a cause of action for a voluntary
disablement by the promisor before the day, the courts do not apply the
formula, used in other cases of anticipatory breach, and which derives, for
the most part, from Smoot's Case, (1872) 15 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. Ed.
107, that the breach must be "positive, distinct, and unequivocal."
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possibility of regained ability. The latter point was raised in Ford
v. Tiley," and the court dismissed it, saying:
"If a day be limited to perform a condition, if the obligor once
disables himself to perform it, though he be enabled again before
the day, yet the condition is broken."
If, however, the date set for performance finds A with re-
gained ability, and in the meanwhile, B has brought no suit and
suffered no change of position,1 ' in reliance upon prospective in-
ability of A, it is believed that nothing would impeach the sound-
ness of a holding that A may enforce the contract against B. All
the elements of an effective withdrawal of repudiation are present.
Nevertheless, the cases do not seem to make this distinction.
Thus in a rcent case,1" the vendor, who had conveyed to third
persons some of the land agreed to be conveyed to the defendant,
sued for specific performance. The complainant, after the answer
was in, and before the case came on for hearing, acquired options
from the persons to whom the conveyances were made, and averred
ability to acquire title and make conveyance in accordance with
the terms of the contract. Denying specific performance, the court
held that the doctrine of perfecting title before decree has no appli-
cation where the vendor, having title at the time of contracting,
subsequently, and without saving the rights of the vendee, conveys
all or a substantial part of the land to a bona fide purchaser.'1 No
change of position on the part of the vendee was shown.
In James v. Burchell,'8 on the other hand, where again the
12(1827) 6 B. & C. 325, 5 L. J. 0. S. K. B. 169.
'
3Although time may not be of the essence of the contract, there would
seem to be no reason for making use of this factor in favor of the repudia-
tor in determining whether the purchaser has changed his position or acted
in reliance on the prospective inability of the vendor. Such action in reli-
ance might consist of failure to commence performance on the purchaser's
part, as in James v. Burchell, (1881) 82 N. Y. 108, or in failure to raise
the money for the land purchase, particularly if this paralleled any tighten-
ing in the money market. Instructive cases ol the cognate problem of
withdrawal of repudiation are Rayburn v. Comstock, (1890) 80 Mich. 448,
45 N. W. 378; Ault v. Dustin, (1898) 100 Tenn. 366, 45 S. W. 981;
Nilson v. Morse, (1881) 52 Wis. 240, 9 N. W. 1 ; Perkins v. Frazer, (1901)
107 La. 390, 31 So. 773; Wharton v. American Law Book Co., (1909) 143
Iowa 517, 121 N. W. 1009.
"4Suburban Improvement Co. v. Scott Lumber Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir.
1933) 67 F. (2d) 335, 90 A. L. R. 330; (1933) 9 Notre Dame Law. 544. 434.
1"The complainant's contention that the conveyance was privileged
because defendant prior thereto had committed an anticipatory breach, was
disposed of by the court in holding that defendant's conduct had not
amounted to anticipatory breach; see foonote 25. This gave the court an
additional ground for denying specific performance, that plaintiff could not
proceed toward specific performance after electing to treat the contract as
broken-a doubtful application of the principle of election of remedies.
16(1881) 82 N. Y. 108.
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plaintiff had regained ability before the day fixed for performance,
the defendant had refrained from making the costly outlay which
performance on his part would have entailed, when he learned of
the plaintiff's interim conveyance. It was held that defendant was
excused from performance, although the analysis of the court was
in terms not of change of position, but of "breach of the covenant
of seisin." The change of position test has been slow in gaining
articulate recognition, though it is supported by most of the
decisions.
The doctrine under discussion is not confined to contracts for
the conveyance of realty; voluntary disablement may occur with
precisely the same deflationary effect in other contractual rela-
tionships. The courts have held that no different legal conse-
quences attend.
17
Since contracts in which promisors voluntarily disable them-
selves from performance are as a rule those which are profitable
to the other party, cases in which the disablement has been invoked
purely as a defense are not numerous.' 8 It should be noted, how-
ever, that in these cases, the disablement was such that the conduct
of the promisor could as easily have been relied on by the proliisee
in an action for breach. As we have seen, a voluntary disablement
is equivalent to an anticipatory breach. Since an anticipatory
breach not only confers a cause of action upon the repudiatee, but
also excuses him from further acts of performance," these cases
illustrate the assertion of the latter segment of the bundle of rights,
privileges and powers so conferred, by a repudiatee who, in this
case, does not choose to exercise the former.
In the situations so far discussed, it has thus been apparent
that prospective inability, voluntarily brought about by the proni-
"7Dicker v. Italo-American Oil Corp., (1931) 119 Cal. App. 451, 6 P.
(2d) 550 (contract to issue stock to plaintiff in return for personal services) :
Bagley v. Cohen, (1898) 121 Cal. 605, 53 Pac. 1117 (contract to pay
plaintiff out of the profits of packing business); Israel v. Northwestern
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., (1910) 111 Minn. 404, 127 N. W. 187 (contract between
agent and insurance company, latter selling out its business); see Ogdens
v. Nelson, [1905] A. C. 109, 74 L. J. K. B. 433, 92 L. T. 478, 53 W. R. 497
(voluntary disablement by liquidation).
'
8 Gray v. Smith, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1897) 28 C. C. A. 168. 83 Fed. 824
(lack of title) ; Fort Payne Coal & Iron Co. v. Webster, (1895) 163 Mass.
134, 39 N. E. 786 (conveyance to a stranger) ; James v. Burchell, (1881)
82 N. Y. 108.
'
9 See excellent analysis in Professor Corbin's American note on anti-
cipatory breach, Anson, Contract, 5th Am. ed.. sec. 385, p. 483. The statute
of limitations does not run, however, from the repudiation; see Matteson
v. Blaisdell, (1921) 148 Minn. 352, 182 N. W. 442; annotation, (1935)
94 A. L. R. 455.
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isor, has entered the picture to be differentiated in no essential re-
spect from the general doctrine of anticipatory breach.20
B. Promisor's Statement of Inability.-WVe have been dealing
thus far with cases in which a high degree of probability has been
created by the acts of one party, that when the time arrives for
performance, he will be unable to render the agreed exchange on
his part; in such a case, the remedies of action for damages, or re-
scission and restitution2 are open to the aggrieved party. What of
the case, however, where the promisor merely states that he is
unable to perform?
The courts as a rule have held that a statement of inability prior
to the day set for performance, is not a sufficiently positive indi-
cation that performance will not occur to come within the purview
of the doctrine of anticipatory breach. In Johnstone v. Milling,"
defendant lessor had covenanted to rebuild the premises after
expiration of the first four of the twenty-one years of the term;
repeatedly he declared his inability to procure funds sufficient for
the work. It was held,2 3 that such statements did not amount to
anticipatory breach, for they could not be taken as equivalent to
saying that no matter what happened it was defendant's intention
not to rebuild.
It would seem, however, that such early24 limitations upon
the doctrine of anticipatory breach should not be perpetuated in
201llustration of this constant tendency appears in In re Spittler, (D.C.
Conn., 1907) 151 Fed. 942, and McRae v. Itasca Paper Co., (1922) 153
Minn. 260, 190 N. W. 72.21See Black, Rescission and Cancellation, sec. 210, 589-590; note 41
L. R. A. (N.S.) 60; also Sutton v. Meyering Land Co., (1929) 248 Mich.
601, 227 N. W. 783; Elder v. Chapman, (1898) 176 I1. 142, 52 N. E. 10.
For an interesting variant, see Eberhart v. Lind, (1933) 173 Wash. 316,
23 P. (2d( 17, involving condemnation of the land contracted for by plaintiff,
before the first payment fell due; deed upon full payment, but as of the
date of the contract; plaintiff sues to rescind; held, for defendant; the deed
as of date of contract was in the nature of a risk-shifting device.
22(1886) 16 Q. B. D. 460, 55 L. J. Q. B. 162, 54 L. T. 6279.23There is reasonable doubt as to whether the case is not explainable
on the ground that the alleged breach did not go sufficiently to the whole of
the consideration; see Lord Esher's opinion; see also Anson, Contract, 5th
Amer. ed., sec. 383. Of course, the repudiation, voluntary disablement, or
prospective inability must go to such a portion of the contract as would
entitle plaintiff to the remedy he seeks if a like actual breach occurred, if
it is to have any effect at all.24Johnstone v. Milling was decided in 1886, thirty-four years after
Hochster v. Delatour, (1853) 2 E. & B. 678, 22 L. J. Q. B. 455, 22 L. T.
0. S. 171, and in the same year as Dingley v. Oler, (1886) 117 U. S. 490,
6 Sup. Ct. 50, 29 L. Ed. 984, which, on its facts, involves a similar extreme
insistence on the mental attitude of the promisor. Cf. In re Spittler, (D.C.
Conn. 1907) 151 Fed. 942; Louisville Packing Co. v. Crain, (1910) 141 Ky.
379, 132 S. W. 575.
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a day when practically all jurisdictions recognize the propriety of
the remedy. No doubt the judicial requirement that intent to
repudiate be unequivocal and absolute represents too great an
insistence upon the subjective aspect of conduct, the legal sig-
nificance of which derives chiefly from its effect upon the expec-
tations of the promisee.2" If a future failure to consummate the
bargain appears highly probable, then the substantive law, assum-
ing the wisdom of according any action for anticipatory breach,
should make no distinction, whether the evidence of such failure
of consumlmation is shown by a statement of intention not to per-
form or by an unqualified assertion of inability.2 '
A recent case,27 however, has re-established the doctrine of
Johnstone v. Milling with equal emphasis. In an action for anticip-
atory breach of a contract to sell cotton to defendant, plaintiff
vendor relied on a letter written while the contract was partly
executory, signed by the treasurer of defendant company, stating
that corporate existence was being terminated, that it hoped to
realize from the sale of its plant sufficient funds to discharge the
debt, and that it was unlikely that plaintiff would care to make
further shipment, "with the uncertainty as to what and when the
payment will be." It was held that though this dismal outlook
indicated unquestionably the desire and intention of defendant to
get out of the contract if possible, it was not a "distinct, unequiv-
ocal, and absolute refusal to perform." The court admitted that
plaintiff may well have had a belief that performance would not
be forthcoming when the time caie to furnish shipping instruc-
tions, sufficient to furnish the foundation for an inference that
there would be an ultimate breach, but said that
"to use this inference of a probable future breach as the equivalent
2.lSee Professor Corbin's justification of the cause of action for anticipa-
tory breach, footnote 84. See also Williston, Lecture on Repudiation of
Contracts. 6 Lectures on Legal Topics, Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, 97 et seq., New York Law Journal, June 20, 21, 1924. Com-
pare Gardner, Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, (1932)
46 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 12-15. Cf. American Bankers' Ins. Co. v. Moore,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 73 S. W. (2d) 620; Kimel v. Missouri State Life
Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 921, where the court said that
an offer to perform in accordance with the promisor's interpretation of the
contract, though it be erroneous, is not a clear and unequivocal refusal to
perform. Accord, Suburban Improvement Co. v. Scott Lumber Co., (C.C.A.
4th Cir. 1933) 67 F. (2d) 335, 90 A. L. R. 330; Mobley v. N. Y. Life Ins.
Co., (1935), 295 U. S. 632, 55 Sup Ct. 876.2GThe existence of situations in which the appearance of prospective
inability is not sufficiently definite to amount to anticipatory breach is
treated at length below. See footnotes 60 ff. and text.
27Wonalancet Co. v. Banfield, (1933) 116 Conn. 582, 165 AtIl. 785.
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of a present, absolute, unequivocal renunciation of the contract...
is plainly without justification. 2 '
However much one may disagree with the court's assumption
that the necessary effect on the promisee is not present in such
statements, 9 the rule is generally accepted, as a part of the doctrine
of anticipatory breach, that a statement of inability, unless coupled
with facts showing an intention not to perform, is not a sufficient
repudiation to give rise to an action before the date for per-
formance.
Here, then, there is re-emphasis of the tendency of the courts
to think in terms of the sharp distinction: breach of duty or no
breach of duty; there is no suggestion of the existence of an
excuse for non-performance by the promisee without a concomi-
tant cause of action. This is so even where a court departs from
the spirit of Johnstone v. Milling. In In re Spittler3 0 the vendee,
under a contract to buy from the vendor the capital stock and plant
of the vendor's firm, became insolvent and communicated to the
vendor the "absolute impossibility" of performing. Holding that
the vendor might treat this as a breach and prove his claim in the
bankruptcy of the vendee, 3 the court said:
"The doubts which assailed [the referee] do not trouble me.
He thinks that the decided cases rather carry the idea that the
refusal to perform or the inability to perform, must be a wrongful
refusal or an inability growing out of a disposition to commit a
wrongful act. I do not so read the cases. An absolute inability
to perform, which is of such a nature that there is no reasonable
probability that thereafter a situation will arise which will make
performance possible, is enough. If to such inability is added a
statement that it exists, then the party so informed is in a position
to treat the contract as broken and to pursue his remedy."
C. Insolvency and Bankruptcy.-Still within the more settled
confines of the field of prospective inability are the effects of in-
solvency and bankruptcy on executory contracts.
(1) Insolvency.-It is well settled that supervening insol-
vency32 of the buyer, in a contract for the sale of goods, excuses
the seller from compliance with the credit term of the contract;
28(1933) 116 Conn. 582, 165 Atl. 785, 787.
29Compare the attitude in Chicago Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium
Association, (1916) 240 U. S. 581, 591, 36 Sup. Ct. 412. 60 L. Ed. 811:
".... bankruptcy proceedings (voluntary or involuntary) are but the natural
and legal consequences of something done or omitted to be done, by the
bankrupt."
3o(D.C. Conn. 1907) 151 Fed. 942.31The court refused to consider the question as to whether the bank-
ruptcy itself constituted a breach.
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he may retain the goods, notwithstanding the passage of title,"
until payment of the price is tendered." And, although this is
not clear on the face of the Uniform Act,"3 it has been held, both
at common law,3 6 and under the Act,37 that in addition to the
excuse, the seller has a privileged power of resale upon refusal or
unreasonable delay by the buyer to tender cash, and the right to
maintain an action for damages, or, in the normal case, to prove
his claim in the buyer's bankruptcy. 8 Delivery on credit, it should
be noted, is the other side of the situation dealt with in section
63 (2) of the Act, where the buyer must pay the price in advance
of the transfer of title.3 9 While it is there provided that the
seller's inability is a defense to the buyer, the latter would have
no cause of action unless the inability amounted to anticipatory
breach. It would therefore seem doubtful if, in the converse situa-
tion just discussed, the seller should have anything more than an
excuse4 0 for not extending credit in accordance with the terms
of the contract.
One further point of sales law is relevant. Suppose, on a
suspicion of the buyer's financial instability, the seller offers a
delivery on sight draft attached to bill of lading, thereby repntdiat-
321nterpreted in cases coming within the present inquiry as meaning an
inability to pay one's debts in the ordinary course of business, or as they
mature-the so-called "equity definition of insolvency." Cunningham v.
Norton, (1888) 125 U. S. 77, 8 Sup Ct. 804, 31 L. F-d. 624; Muchlstein
& Co. v. Hickman, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928),26 F. (2d) 40, 58 A. L. R. 1294:
Crummey v. Raudenbush, (1893) 55 Minn. 426, 56 N. W. 1113.33Uniform Sales Act, sec. 53.
34At common law, see Crummey v. Raudenbush, (1893) 55 Min. 426,
56 N. W. 1113; Pratt v. Freeman & Sons Mfg. Co., (1902) 115 Wis. 648,
92 N. W. 386. See Uniform Sales Act, sec. 54; Muehlstein & Co. v.
Hickman, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928) 26 F. (2d) 40. 58 A. L. R. 1294.
35Sec. 53 and 60 could be so interpreted.
3"Pratt v. Freeman & Sons Mlfg. Co.. (1902) 115 Wis. 648, 92 N. W.
368. A contrary dictum appears in Morgan v. Bain, (1874) L. R. 10 C. P.
15, 27.37Muehlstein & Co. v. Hickman. (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928) 26 F. (2d)
40, 58 A. L. R. 1294. The court relied on the Pratt case, and did not purport
to construe the act.
38Muehlstein & Co. v. Hickman, (C.C A. 8th Cir. 1928) 26 F. (2d)
40, 58 A. L. R. 1294.
s°Sec. 63 (2) is declaratory of the common law theretofore applicable
to independent covenants, as stated in rule 1 of the reporter's note to
Pordage v. Cole, (1669) 1 Wms. Saund. 319; see Gourd v. Healy, (1917)
176 App. Div. 464, 163 N. Y. S. 637; no case has been found giving effect
to the defense of seller's inability there given to the buyer.
40Supervening bankruptcy gives the seller a claim for breach on indepen-
dent grounds; see footnotes 47-59. The Muehlstein Case might be ex-
plained on this ground; furthermore, in that case the buyer refused to give
shipping instructions, although it is not clear from the opinion that that
was a promissory condition.
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ing the credit term of the contract. Mere doubts as to solvency
being of no operative significance,"' and the conduct constituting
a breach, the rules as to recovery worked out by some courts
appear to be as follows: The buyer may recover the market
price minus the contract price if, at the time the seller demanded
cash, the buyer was in fact unable to pay cash ; but if at that time
he was able to pay cash, he may recover only interest on the sum
involved for the credit period, inasmuch as he is not permitted
to enlarge his claim by refusing to consider the seller as part of
the market in mitigation of damages; if lie was able to do so he
should have accepted the tender at the contract price for cash.'-
There is no presumption of ability to pay cash,' 3 and the seller,
ironically enough, bears the burden of showing the buyer's ability
in this respect.
Observe the effect of this rule: if the seller's suspicion has
been so accurate that the buyer in fact was disabled to pay cash,
he suffers the harsher measure of damages."4 But if his suspicion
has been poorly founded, the recovery is limited to interest for the
credit period. Prospective inability is thus a trap for the seller
in this situation. The result, however, seems sound. Since the
contract called for delivery on credit, the ability of the buyer to
pay cash on delivery is irrelevant; a discovery by S that B is
unable to perform an act not required under the contract should
have no effect upon the rights of the parties thereto. Further-
more, a failure by S to deliver according to the contract terms
might well be the cause of disabling B to pay at the termination of
the stipulated credit period.
(2) Bankrzcptcy.-After much fluctuation in the federal
courts4" on the question of whether bankruptcy was an anticipatory
breach of an executory contract, the question was finally settled
41Jewett Publishing Co. v. Butler, (1893) 159 Mass. 517, 34 N. 1-. 1087;
Koppelon v. Ritter Flooring Corp., (1922) 97 N. J. L. 200, 116 Atl. 491.
42Cook Manufacturing Co. v. Randall, (1883) 62 Iowa 244, 17 N. W.
507; Plesofsky v. Kaufman, (1918) ; 140 Tenn. 208, 204 S. W. 204; Payzu,
Ltd. v. Saunders, [1919] 2 K. B. 581, 89 L. J. K. B. 17, 121 L. T. 563. But
see, on the measure of damages, Coppola v. Marden, Orth & Hastings,
(1917) 282 Ill. 281, 118 N. E. 499; here, however, the seller made no
attempt, apparently, to prove the buyer's ability to pay cash. Other courts
consider that the buyer is under no obligation to accept the seller's offer.
See note, (1936) 20 MINXNESOTA LAw REvIEw 300.
43Cook Mfg. Co. v. Randall, (1883) 62 Iowa 244, 17 N. W. 507.
"Normally the market will be higher; the seller's suspicions become
more sensitive as the contract price on the credit delivery sinks in relation
thereto. See Coppola v. Marden, Orth & Hastings, (1917) 282 I1. 281,
118 N. E. 499.
"sSee Gilbert's Collier on Bankruptcy, 3d ed., 988.
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when the Auditorium Hotel put in a claim of indebtedness in the
involuntary bankruptcy of the organization which had contracted
to furnish transfer and baggage service for the claimant. Over the
objection that to constitute an anticipatory breach within the doc-
trine of Roehm v. Horst,"6 the repudiation must be positive and
unequivocal, the Supreme Court held that the lower court had
correctly decided that intervention of bankruptcy constituted such
a breach of the contract as to give rise to a provable claim founded
upon a contract express or implied within the meaning of section
63 a-4 of the National Bankruptcy Act.47  Said the Court :1
"It must be deemed an implied term of every contract that the
promisor will not permit himself, through insolvency or acts of
bankrupcty, to be disabled from making performance; and, in this
view, bankruptcy proceedings are but the natural and legal con-
sequences of something done or omitted to be done, by the bank-
rupt, in violation of his engagement.
49 
"
The effect, therefore, is that the bankruptcy of the promisor in
46(1900) 178 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 780, 44 L. Ed. 953.
47Chicago Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, (1916) 240 U. S.
581, 36 Sup. Ct. 412, 60 L. Ed. 811; see Glenn. Liquidation, sec. 491.
48(1916) 240 U. S. 581, 36 Sup. Ct. 412, 60 L. Ed. 811.
49 1
n re Nye, (D.C. Minn. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 558 (contract to employ
plaintiff as director) ; In re Catts, (D.C. N.Y. 1929) 33 F. (2d) 963 (con-
tract to acquire and convey to plaintiff a lease) : but see In re 35% Auto-
mobile Supply Co., (D.C. N.Y., 1917) 247 Fed. 377 (contract to pay plaintiff
out of future net earnings; held, voluntary bankruptcy not a breach; the
agreement was to pay out of future eafnings if there were any). As to
receivership, notwithstanding, there is usually an allegation, not of in-
solvency, but of solvency. See Napier v. People's Stores, (1923) 98 Conn.
414, 120 AtlI. 295 (sale of goods) ; Glenn, Liquidation, sec. 491, note 55;
Stern v. Mayer, (1926) 166 Minn. 346, 207 N. W. 737 (contract for sale of
capital stock of bankrupt concern; trustee cannot perform such contract):
Drake v. Hodgson, (1920) 192 App. Div. 676. 183 N. Y. S. 486; cf. Phenix
Nat'l Bank v. Waterbury, (1910) 197 N. Y. 161, 90 N. E. 435. The New
York lower courts have followed the appellate division, In re Rothstein's
Will, (1930) 238 N. Y. S. 696, 699, but the court of appeals has yet to
speak finally. See also Kamps & Sacksteder Drug Co. v. United Drug Co.,
(1916) 164 Wis. 412, 160 N. Y. 271.
As to rent claims, for the law prior to the 1934 amendment to section
63a of the Bankruptcy Act, see Manhattan Properties Inc. v. Irving Trust
Co., (1934) 291 U. S. 320, 54 Sup. Ct. 385, 78 L. Ed. 825, containing a
review of the authorities; see also Bloch v. Bell Furniture Co., (1932) Ill
N. J. Eq. 441, 162 Ati. 414; note (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 143: for a detailed
discussion see Schwabacher and Weinstein, Rent Claims in Bankruptcy,
(1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 213. The extent of the modification worked by sec-
tion 63a as amended June 7, 1934, adding, inter alia, subdivision 7 of section
63a, II U. S. C. A. sec. 103 (a). is not within the scope of this paper.
See, in general, Glenn, Liquidation, sees. 494, 495, 496; Bankruptcy Act,
sec. 77B(b), 48 Stat. 912(1), 11 U. S. C. A. ch. 8, 207(b), providing in
part: "In case an executory contract or unexpired lease of real estate shall
be rejected pursuant to direction of the judge given in a proceeding insti-
tuted under this section ... any person injured by such rejection shall for
all purposes of this section and of the reorganization plan, its acceptance
and confirmation, be deemed to be a creditor."
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an executory contract gives rise, with certain exceptions, 0 to a
provable claim in the proceedings, on the ground that an anticipa-
tory breach has occurred; yet this does not impair the right of the
trustee, who for this purpose stands in theshoes of the bankrupt,
within a reasonable time to carry out the contract."'
From the point of view of bankruptcy law, the Auditorium
Case may be viewed as an attempt by the court to render provable
contingent claims52 not otherwise provided for by the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898.53  In attaining this result through the contract doc-
trine of anticipatory breach, the court has pleased neither the
writers on contract law 5 ' nor students of bankruptcy." The
theoretical difficulties introduced by the doctrine of anticipatory
breach have denied thorough adequacy to this basis for prov-
ability of contingent claims.58
5OSee In re United Cigar Stores Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1934) 72 F. (2d)
673, cert. den., (1934) 293 U. S. 617, 55 Sup. Ct. 210, holding that bankruptcy
is not a breach of a requirements contract, the court saying: "Though
bankruptcy may not excuse a breach, it may have so changed the buyer's
requirements that this contract was not broken." As to the rent cases, see
footnote 49.
5'United States Trust Co. v. Wabash & Western Ry. Co., (1893) 150
U. S. 287, 14 Sup. Ct. 86, 37 L. Ed. 1085; Brown v. Rushton, (1916) 223
Mass. 80, 111 N. E. 884; Gilbert's Collier on Bankruptcy, 3d ed., 1249-50.
52For definitions of "contingent claim" see Colman Co. v. Withoft,
(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1912) 195 Fed. 250, 252, and In re Mullins Clothing Co.,
(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1916) 238 Fed. 58. Uncertainty merely as to damages, not
as to the existence of the claim, presents no problem of contingency; liquida-
tion occurs under the broad mandate of 63b, 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 103, 1 Mason's
U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 63b.
53Contingent debts and liabilities, whether liquidated or unliquidated,
and including rent claims, have been provable in bankruptcy in England
since the Act of 1869, 32 & 33 Vict. ch. 71; Glenn, Liquidation, sec. 491;
in the United States, both the Acts of 1841, 5 Stat. at L. 440. and of 1867,
14 Stat. at L. 517, made provision for proving contingent debts and demands;
it seems, however, that claims for future rent were not deemed provable:
see Manhattan Properties Inc. v. Irving Trust Co.. (1934) 291 U. S. 320,
54 Sup. Ct. 385, 78 L. Ed. 825. The Act of 1898, 35 Stat. at L. 838, 11
U. S. C. A., makes no express provision therefor.54See Williston, 6 Lectures on Legal Topics 108-110: 3 WVilliston.
Contracts, secs. 1327, 1987; 2 id. sec. 880; Restatement. Contracts. secs.
287. 324. See also discussion in Weinstein and Schwabacher, Rent Claims
in Bankruptcy, (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 213, 232-34.
5 5Weinstein and Schwabacher, Rent Claims in Bankruptcy, (1933)
33 Col. L. Rev. 213; Glenn, Liquidation, sec. 491.
5(There is no disablement until the adjudication of bankruptcy; if the
promisee must then "accept" the repudiation, this election must be related
back to the filing of the petition. See In re Portage Rubber Co.. (C.C.A.
6th Cir. 1924), 296 Fed. 289, cert. den. (1924) 266 U. S. 604, 45 Sup. Ct.
91, 69 L. Ed. 463. It would not be permitted to the repudiatee to refuse to
"accept" the breach, and thus secure exemption from the discharge, see
Lesser v. Gray, (1915) 236 U. S. 70, 35 Sup. Ct. 227. 59 L. Ed. 471; Burns
'Mortgage Co. v. Bond Realty Corp., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1931) 47 F. (2d)
985) see (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 600. The court in the Burns case said:
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Coming after Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.,57 it was not absolutely necessary for the court to invoke the
doctrine of anticipatory breach; and since Maynard v. Elliott,58
which provides a broad basis for proving contingent claims, the
function of the case as in aid of the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act with respect to contingent claims would seem to have been
rendered largely unnecessary.
For the purpose of the present paper, however, it is sufficient to
note that in so far as bankruptcy indicates inability to perform,
especially when the promisor is a corporation, the solution has
again been found in conferring an immediate cause of action; no
distinction has been made between voluntary and involuntary bank-
ruptcy ;" and the court, in adopting this approach, has apparently
assumed that without it, the contingent claim would not have been
provable.
III. PROSPECTIVE INABILITY AS Excuse FOR NON-PERFORMANCE.
The foregoing summary has revealed the legal consequences of
prospective inability to perform, when joined with the manifes-
tations from which an imnediate cause of action arises in favor
of the promisee against the disabled prolnisor. °0 However, the
limitations which courts have thrown about the doctrine of anti-
cipatory breach, and to which attention has been directed, make
possible situations in which the conduct of the promisor does
"This optiod6, if allowed, would defeat the objects of the Bankruptcy Act.
It would seem that in cases where specific performance could not be had,
that the decision in Lesser v. Gray implies that all remedy on the contract
ceases with the bankruptcy, except that for the anticipatory breach. A
seller must keep undelivered goods and prove only for his claim." (C.C.A.
5th Cir. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 985, 987.
57(1915) 236 U. S. 549, 35 Sup. Ct. 289, 59 L. Ed. 713. The right of a
surety under section 57i of the Bankruptcy Act, to prove the principal claim
in the name of the creditor, and so to reduce its own liability by the amount
of the dividends payable thereon, as to a liability contingent at the time of
the petition (though default of principal occurred before bankruptcy) was
held to bar a later suit by the surety for indemnity, such right under 57i
not having been exercised in the bankruptcy proceedings.
58(1931) 283 U. S. 273, 51 Sup. Ct. 390, 75 L. Ed. 1028. The claim of
a holder of notes indorsed by the bankrupt was held provable although
contingent not only on non-payment by the maker, but upon compliance
with the appropriate steps necessary to hold parties secondarily liable.59See footnote 29.6 01n Hall. v. Consumers Ice Co., (1933) 260 N. Y. 417, 183 N. E. 903,
the company failed to call for payment in 1930 and 1931 its bonds to the
amount agreed to be called yearly from 1930 to 1939. The trial court, holding
for the plaintiff in his suit upon seven of the bonds, said there was "such
an anticipatory inability . . . to perform as amounts to a breach." Although
the court of appeals indicated that there was a present breach, it also con-
sidered the fact that the promisor corporation had conveyed away all of its
assets as amounting to anticipatory breach.
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not sufficiently manifest future non-performance to warrant sub-
jection to an immediate cause of action, but in which, nevertheless,
prospective inability is made reasonably dear, and conduct in re-
liance by the promisee seems justified. It is in such situations
that problems of the most interest in this field arise.
Suppose the contractual relation existing between A and B,
extending over some period of time, and consisting of the per-
formance on the part of each of nmtual and dependent promises,
becomes undesirable in the eyes of A because of the prospective
inability of B to perform in the future. The impending deflation,
in future non-performance by B, of A's interest in such future
performance, may involve (a) an unexcused inability which will
render B liable for breach when the non-performance occurs, or
(b) circumstances of legal impossibility which will excuse B's
failure to perform.
A cessation of performance by A under the circumstances last
mentioned has been before the courts infrequently. In the case
of The Kronprinzessin Cecdiie,61 the master of the vessel, which
was carrying gold to England, turned back, upon the declaration of
war on July 31, 1914. The bill of lading representing the gold
contained a "restraint of Princes" clause. The court held that
such conduct incurred no liability. The effect of this holding is
that anticipation of an event which, if it occurred, wotld excuse
performance, 62 it itself a basis for refusal of performancQ
The first of the two cases mentioned above involves prospec-
tive non-performance on the part of B, which, if it occurred.
would be unexcused. First as to the case where the suspicion
turns out to be the fact. Is A safe in so refusing to perform,
or has he committed a breach for which B can hold him, B being
entitled to sue on the ground that A's repudiation has excused
further performance or ability to perform on his part ?
A review of the cases will show, it is believed, that .\ is safe in
this situation. While a repudiation will excuse the repudiatee
from making further preparations for performance, and from
61(1918) 244 U. S. 12, 37 Sup. Ct. 490, 61 L. Ed. 960.
62See Anson, Contract, 5th Am. Ed., secs. 373-380.
63Contra, Mitsui & Co. v. Watts. Watts & Co.. Ltd.. 119161 2 K. B. 820;
Piaggio v. Somerville, (1918) 119 Miss. 6. 80 So. 342. Accord with the
principal case, Williams v. Miller, (1885) 68 Cal. 290, 9 Pac. 166 (Contract
of agistment) ; German-American Securities Co. v. McCulloch. (1903) 28
Ky. L. Rep. 133, 89 S. W. 5 (investment in bonds of company, which.
because of certain conditions therein, would have been illegal).
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averring performance of otherwise necessary acts6 4 it seems
clear that the defense is open to the repudiator, A in our case,
to show that B, the repudiatee, would have been unable to per-
form, even if the repudiation had not occurred. 5 In the words
of Judge Learned Hand, speaking of B's supervening inability
after an anticipatory breach by A, a related situation :66
"It is, indeed, one of the consequences of the doctrine of
anticipatory breach that, if damages are assessed before the
time of performance has expired, the court must take the chance
of forecasting the future as best it can. . . . Hence it is always an
answer . . . to show that had the contract continued, the promisee
would not have been entitled when the promisor disabled himself
or repudiated."
Weinglass v. Gibson67 is an interesting recent case in this re-
spect. Here the defendant theater owner, in whose theater plain-
tiff had contracted to produce a play during Christmas week,
committed an anticipatory breach by making a similar contract
with another producer, and advertising the latter play. Plain-
tiff shipped on some billing matter, and telegraphed defendant
that he was ready and able to perform and elected to hold de-
fendant in damages. Since, as the court held, defendant had
clearly committed an anticipatory breach, should the defense be
open that plaintiff would have been unable to perform, even in
the absence of the repudiation? The court held that it was
permissive to defendant to show in defense that two of plaintiff's
cast were under contracts to appear elsewhere during Christmas
week, but found that the evidence on this point was confused,
and held that a verdict discrediting the defense should not be
disturbed. Implicit in the opinion was the court's disbelief that
64Royal Ins. Co. v. Martin, (1904) 192 U. S. 149, 24 Sup. Ct. 247,
48 L. Ed. 385 (insured excused from furnishing proofs) ; Trowbridge v.
Jefferson Auto Co., (1918) 92 Conn. 569, 103 Atl. 843 (tender excused);
Mertz v. Wallace, (1929) 93 Ind. App. 289, 169 N. E. 333 (lessor excused
from further readiness to perform) ; McCaull-Dinsmore Co. v. Jackson,(1920) 57 Mont. 555, 189 Pac. 771 (repudiation by buyer of wheat);
Graham v. Frazier, (1896) 49 Neb. 90, 68 N. W. 367 (tender of price
excused in contract to purchase cattle) ; Ferber v. Cona, (1916) 89 N. J. L.
135, 97 Atl. 720 (contract to build garage) ; Strassburger v. Leerburger,
(1922) 233 N. Y. 55, 134 N. E. 834 (tender of price in sale of goods)
Serviss v. Hirsh, (1935) 243 App. Div. 782, 277 N. Y. S. 720.
"sSee Professor Corbin, Cases on Contracts, 684, note: "Repudiation or
impossibility on the part of the defendant would justify the plaintiff in
refusing to perform, but they do not cause possibility of performance by
the plaintiff to cease to be a condition precedent to his enforceable right."
66New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transport Corp., (C.C.A. 2d
Cir. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 653, 654.
67(1931) 304 Pa. St. 203, 155 Atli. 439.
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defendant's repudiation in fact had occurred because of a belief
in plaintiff's prospective inability. Had the proof supported the
defense, however, this consideration should not affect it. If the
plaintiff, irrespective of the repudiation, were himself unable to
perform, he should have no right to a recovery of damages."
It thus seems clear that if A refuses performance because of
B's prospective inability not amounting to an anticipatory breach
on B's part, and B in fact is unable at the due date, A cannot
be held in damages for his refusal to perform, the defense being
open to him that, apart from his (A's) repudiation, B would have
been, and was, unable to perform.
One of the risks, however, run by A in this connection, is
that the court may take the position that his repudiation was a
substantial or contributing factor in inducing B's inability."9 Espe-
cially true is this where B's inability concerns the payment of
money, and A has refused to deliver on credit. 0
And judicial reluctance to extend A's rights upon the mani-
festation of inability by B is brought out clearly where A seeks
rescission, relying upon the difficulties which beset performance
by B, and which point to a future breach. In Brady v. Oliver,"
plaintiff sought to rescind a construction contract because of the
prospective inability of defendant to complete the work within the
time set, time being of the essence. Denying that prospective
inability to perform on time, even where time is of the essence,
was any ground for rescission, the court stated that the unwill-
ingness or disability to perform must be a present and existing
68 That the disabled party cannot recover, see Peterson v. City of Wells-
ville, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1926), 14 F. (2d) 38 (construction contract) ; Reeves
Lumber Co. v. Davis, (1916) 124 Ark. 143, 187 S. W. 171 (lumbering
contract); Driensky v. Skonieczny, (1920) 209 I1. App. 188 (exchange
ofreal estate); Dosch v. Andrus, (1910) 111 Minn. 287, 126 N. \V. 1071(repudiation excuses tender of deed, but repudiatee must have been able);
Gerli v. Poidebard Silk Co., (1894) 57 N. J .L. 432, 31 Ati. 401. 30 L. R. A.
61 (sale of silk) ; Wells v. Page, (1905) 48 Or. 74, 82 Pac. 856 (land
contract); McCormick v. Tappendorf, (1909) 51 Wash. 312, 99 Pac. 2
(contract to sell railroad ties). See also Wade v. Lutterlock. (1928) 196
N. C. 116, 144 S. E. 694 (contract to sell stock); and Brandon v. Smith,(1931), 16 La. App. 130, 133 So. 489 (land contract).
There is language to the contrary in Taylor v. Oakes, Roncoroni &Co., (1922) 127 L. T. R. 267, 38 T. L. R. 517, 66 Sol. Jo. 556; but this
case is expressly based on Braithwaite v. Foreign Hardwood Co., 11905)
2 K. B. 543, 74 L. J. K. B. 688, 92 L. T. 637, 21 T. L R. 413; it is believed
the cases are not inconsistent on their facts with the rule stated in the text.
69See Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Martin, (Tex. Civ. App. 1914)
163 S. W. 313.7OSee cases cited in footnote 42.
71(1911) 125 Tenn. 595, 147 S. \\r. 1135, 41 L. R. A. (N.S.) 60.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
"legally accomplished" fact, and not a "mere potentiality."' 2 A
fortiori, where time is not of the essence, prospective inability gives
the promisee no power to repudiate or ask for rescission."'
Assuming, now, that A has a defense to B's action for breach,
has his refusal to perform cost him his cause of action, or counter-
claim, against B for B's ultimate inability? If B's conduct had
amounted to a voluntary disablement, A would have been ex-
cused from performance and would have had his immediate cause
of action against B.74 But B's conduct has not amounted to
anticipatory breach. Should A's failure to perform .because of
B's prospective inability deprive him of a cause of action for
actual breach?
The cases do not seem conclusive.7" Even were the doctrine
of excuse76 made articulate in this connection, it would be argu-
able that inasmuch as recovery is the pecuniary substitute for per-
formance, and since performance is earned by a return perform-
ance or a tender thereof, A, by withholding his performance has
not earned his right to a return performance.
Two cases may be imagined: (1) A repudiates; B subse-
quently becomes unable to perform, but had manifested no inabil-
ity at the time A repudiated. Upon proof by A of such inability,
B cannot recover against A .7  (2) A repudiates because he ac-
curately senses the coming breach, upon manifestations of inability
on the part of B. Again B cannot recover from A, since A can
show B's actual inability. 78 In the former case, however, A should
have no cause of action, since he repudiated without semblance
72Cf. Sutton v. Meyering Land Co., (1929) 248 Mich. 601, 227 N. W.
783 (rescission allowed) ; see also Eberhart v. Lind, (1933) 173 Wash.
316, 23 P. (2d) 17.73Holt v. Security Life Ins. Co., (1908) 76 N. J. L. 585, 72 Atl. 301,
21 L. R. A. (N.S.) 691.
74See footnote 9 ff.
75Russell-Miller Milling Co. v. McLean, (1925) 48 S. D. 198, 203 N. W.
498 (cause of action) ; and Robertson v. Davenport & Patterson, (1855)
27 Ala. 574 (recoupment), indicate that the action will lie. The cases
holding that the disabled party cannot recover from the other party, do
not discuss the point.
T6On "excuse" in general, see Ferson, Excuse as a Legal Concept,
(1933) 7 U. Cin. L. Rev. 362, not, however, discussing the instant topic.
7 7New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transport Co. (C.C.A. 2d Cir.
1929) 34 F. (2d) 653; Driensky v. Sconieczny, (1920) 209 I1. App. 188.
In cases where A has ceased performance for some other reason than that
B was prospectively unable to perform, and it turns out that in fact B is
unable at the due date, an analysis of the problem in the more conventional
terms of prevention of performance by the other party (see Miles v. Metzger,
(1934) 316 Pa. St. 211, 173 Att. 285; Restatement, Contracts, sec. 295;
Williston, Contracts, sec. 677) is impossible.
78See footnote 68.
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of an excuse. But in the latter it would seem that A should be
so entitled, subject to a showing by B that A, too, would have
been unable to perform, apart from B's manifestations of inability;
both parties would in this event be free."0 A's non-performance
would be excusable on the ground that no man is compelled to
do an act useless in accomplishing its intended purpose, in this
case, to receive a return performance by B.80 But A's non-per-
formance should be material as to the amount of damages re-
coverable.8'
The statement in one case8 2 that A's failure to perform is
non-prejudicial on the ground that he is disabled to enhance
damages by further performance, is theoretically unsound unless
confined to the case where the manifestation of inability by B is
itself a breach.
So far, we have been dealing with the rights of A and B where
B in fact was unexcusably disabled at the due date for perform-
ance. A crucial case, testing the position of the courts with re-
gard to the reality of the excuse, arises where B, subsequently and
before the maturity of A's claim, regains ability.
Regained ability has, as we have seen, been held ineffective
where B's conduct amounted to voluntary disablement.83  Should
it be otherwise where B's conduct has not been thus colorable?
Clearly, unless A has changed his position, regained ability should
entitle B to the benefit of his bargain; any other rule would put
B in a worse position than a repudiator, who may, under the pre-
vailing view of anticipatory breach, effectively withdraw his re-
pudiation before change of position, or before suit brought, by the
repudiatee.
Suppose A has changed his position in reliance on the mani-
festations of inability? That the courts have recognized that pre-
mature indications of a future breach should not go without effect,
however great may be the strain upon legal theory produced by
recognition thereof,8 4 is attested by the mass of decisions involving
,
9See Restatement, Contracts, sec. 306.
BORestatement, Contracts, sec. 306. See comment (a).
81Restatement, Contracts, sec. 288.8 2Wm. Cramp & Sons v. United States, (1915) 50 Ct. Cl. 179.
83See. footnote 7.84Justification is found not so much in theory, as in practical considera-
tions of policy. As Professor Corbin has said, to allow the action is desir-
able inasmuch as the anticipatory breach "frequently causes immediate loss
in property values; it disturbs the mind and serenity of the promisee, and
an immediate action makes for an early settlement of the dispute and a
timely payment of damages." American Note on Anticipatory Breach,
Anson, Contracts, 5th Am. ed., p. 481-482.
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anticipatory breach. And a few cases have gone to the extent of
giving effect, as anticipatory breach, to statements, without re-
quiring that the intent to repudiate be absolute and unequivocal,"
and of giving similar effect to an unexcused inability existing
under circumstances devoid of any reasonable indications of fu-
ture recovery," even though the facts could not be fitted into the
mould of voluntary disablement.
A change of position, in reasonable reliance on manifestations
of inability by the other party, is the subject of a group of sections
in the Restatement of Contracts." Effect is there given, to mani-
festations not involving anticipatory breach, by conferring upon
the party who has taken such a change of position, a privileged
power of divesting the apparently disabled party of his right to a
return performance, even though the latter has regained ability to
perform within the proper time.8"
85In re Spittler, (D.C. Conn. 1907) 151 Fed. 942; DeMille Co. v. Casey,
(1921) 115 Misc. Rep. 646, 189 N. Y. S. 275, the court quoted Williston,
and said: "As a practical matter, it made no difference to the De Mille
Company whether its failure to receive royalties was due to a repudiation
of the contract, on Casey's part, to wilfulness, or to impecuniosity. Whether
the default was wilful or from neglect merely, is in my opinion immaterial."
According to Professor Williston, a confusion between what facts
should confer a cause of action and what facts should constitute excuse,
underlies the doctrine of anticipatory breach. Recognition of the excuse
without the cause of action, in the subject of the present discussion, is on
that account undoubtedly made more difficult. See Williston, Contracts,
sec. 1331, at p. 2385.8 5Wm. Cramp & Sons v. United States, (1915) 50 Ct. Cl. 179.
8 7Restatement, Contracts, secs. 280-287.
8 8The blackletter language of the sections, 280-287, is not unimpeachably
clear. Thus the blackletter of 280, the pivot of the next seven sections, is
capable of the interpretation that it applies only to a statement, i. e., verbal
conduct, of the promisor; but the comment, and the illustrations to the
succeeding sections prove the contrary. Furthermore, as will be shown, tile
state of case authority rendered these sections more than descriptive of the
existing law; on innovations in the Restatement, see Patterson, Restatement
of the Law of Contracts, (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 397, 414.
Professor Havighurst, however, in The Restatement of the Law of
Contracts, (1933) 27 Ill. L. Rev. 910, has questioned the application of
sections 283 and 284 (prospective inability by lack of title) to a case of
regained ability. He queries, at p. 919: "If a purchaser under a land con-
tract changes his position on acquiring knowledge of a cloud on the vendor's
title, must he perform if the vendor seasonably removes the cloud?" It is
believed, however, that illustration 1, sec. 283, furnishes the answer. It is
there provided that if B, vendor, before the date of the closing, secures a
release of C's dower interest, because of the existence of which A, purchaser,
ignorant thereof at the time of contracting, had changed his position by
contracting to buy other land, and tenders a proper deed seasonably, A
need not accept such deed. Furthermore, unless such sections as 280, 282
(prospective inability by-illness of personal servant). 283 and 284 (lack of
title), and 286 (prospective illegality), refer to a promisor who has re-
gained ability, they are pointless, since a disabled promisor would be denied
recovery on independent grounds. See footnote 68; and see Restatement,
Contracts, sec. 277.
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In this, the Restatement has followed the view previously ex-
pressed by legal writers who have considered the question at any
length. 9 But an examination of the cases has convinced the
writer that it departs from the scattered and unpersuasive case
authority on the point.
Wherever the case has arisen, in which one party's manifesta-
tions of inability, relied on by the other as an excuse for non-
performance, have not taken the form of voluntary disablement,
or insolvency, the courts have taken the view 90 that the latter
does not have the power to divest the former of his right, by per-
forming, to become entitled to the benefits of the contract." As
a rule, the discussion of the point in the opinion has been color-
lessly confined to a judicial fiat to that effect; but no less a jurist
than Holmes has said, at least in the case of an executory agree-
ment to pay money,92 that "the degree of his [purchaser's] ability
at any moment before he was called on to pay was no concern of
the defendant's. 9 3
It thus appears that there is disparity between the state of the
89Williston, Contracts, secs. 768, 875, 1326, 1331, and especially secs.
877-880; Void, Repudiation of Contracts, (1927) 5 Neb. L. B. 269, 303-308.
9oStated concisely in Page, Contracts, (2d ed.) sec. 2940: "The fact
that A has reasonable cause to believe, and does believe, that B will be
unable to perform his part of the contract, does not of itself discharge A
from performing his part. . . . The fact that it is highly improbable that
B will be able to perform the contract does not discharge A if the time for
performance has not come and B has not yet failed to perform. . . . As
long as the time for performance has not yet arrived, the fact that so much
time has elapsed since the contract was made, and so little time is left for
performance that in all probability the promisor will not perform, does
not discharge the adversary party." [Citations omitted].
9 1Smutz v. Holliday, (1919) 186 Iowa 784, 172 N. W. 948 (land con-
tract) ; Coonan v. City of Cape Girardeau, (1910) 149 Mo. App. 609, 129
S. W. 745 (construction contract) ; Gooch v. Coleman, (1916) 22 N. M. 45,
159 Pac. 945 (contract to sell cattle) ; Morgan v. Tucker, (1905) 78 Vt. 56,
61 At. 863 (logging contract); Hathaway v. Sabin, (1891) 63 Vt. 527
(contract to furnish music hall). See also Kavanaugh Mfg. Co. v. Rosen.
(1902) 132 Mich. 44, 92 N. W. 788 (contract for sale of goods) ; Dimon
Corp. v. Federal Sugar Refining Co., (1925) 215 App. Div. 140, 213 N. Y. S.
277 (same); Plummer v. Kelly, (1897) 7 N. D. 88, 73 N. W. 70 (land
contract) ; Brady v. Oliver, (1911) 125 Tenn. 595, 147 S. W. 1135, 41
L. R. A. (N.S.) 60; Jefferson v. Paskell, (1916) 1 K. B. 57, 85 L. J. K. B.
398, 113 L. T. 1189 (marriage contract).
92In Lowe v. Harwood, (1885) 139 Mass. 133, 29 N. E. 538.
93 1t is generally stated that contracts to pay money are not subject to
anticipatory breach: Roehm v. Horst, (1900) 178 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 780.
44 L. Ed. 953; Alger-Fowler Co. v. Tracy, (1906) 98 Minn. 432, 107 N. NV.
1124; contra, Pollock v. Pollock, (Tex. Comm. App. 1932) 46 S. W. (2d)
292; but in Lowe v. Harwood, (1885) 139 Mass. 133, 29 N. E. 538, there
were mutual covenants, and therefore the reason stated in Roehm v. Horst
for the non-applicability of anticipatory breach to contracts to pay money
would not apply.
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authorities and the position taken by the Restatement. However
much the actual conflict with the decided cases may be whittled
away by distinctions, it is clear that the Restatement has blazed
a new trail. Disinction, of course, is possible. Thus it does not
appear that in any of the cases cited in support of the text"' was
it urged upon the court that the defendant had changed his posi-
tion, nor did it clearly appear that such had been the case; but
if counsel had urged that point, authority giving it significance,
in this connection, could not have been found.
The view that manifestations indicating prospective inability,
but not constituting anticipatory breach, should be held to give
the promisee a privileged power, by changing his position, to de-
prive the prospectively disabled party of future benefits, will de-
pend, for acceptance, largely upon the weight accorded the Re-
statement by the judiciary. It is believed that the position taken
by the writers and the Restatement is more nearly in accord with
the sentiments of the business community; and that it does not un-
duly threaten the obligation of contracts to allow the promisee,
upon a reasonable belief that future performance will fail, to con-
solidate his position by making new arrangements in the interest
of stability.
94See footnote 91.
